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NOTE 
In Custodia Legis: Implied Warranty of 
Habitability Procedure in Missouri 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
The common law has changed drastically in its treatment of tenants who 
rent their living spaces from landlords.  Over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury,  property doctrine has evolved in response to an ever changing society.1  
Although early common law failed to recognize the relationship between land-
lord and tenant as a contractual relationship, modern common law has devel-
oped to treat the relationship as such.2  The implication of contractual princi-
ples upon the relationship has increased the scope of duties landlords owe ten-
ants in exchange for the tenants’ agreed upon rent.3   
The evolution of the law has most notably encouraged landlords to be-
come more responsible for maintaining safe and habitable living spaces for 
their tenants.  The contractual nature imputed into the relationship between 
modern landlords and tenants allows tenants to abandon their leases when the 
living spaces are uninhabitable through a doctrine known as constructive evic-
tion.4  However, abandoning leased premises carries serious risks for tenants, 
particularly tenants of lower income classes.5  With this in mind, our legal sys-
tem has developed the implied warranty of habitability, which protects vulner-
able tenants by allowing them to remain in possession of unsafe living spaces 
while withholding their monthly rent payments.   
Kohner Properties, Inc. v. Johnson applies an evolving modern habitabil-
ity doctrine to a landlord-tenant dispute over unpaid rent.6  The situation in 
Kohner is one in which a tenant refused to pay her rent because she asserted 
  
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2020, Layout and Design Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2019–2020.  Thanks to 
Professor Freyermuth for his assistance and feedback, as well as the Missouri Law Re-
view for valuable insight and help. 
 1. See King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 70–75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). 
 2. Id. at 70.  
 3. Id. at 69 (discussing the evolution from caveat emptor to the modern doctrine 
of the implied warranty of habitability). 
 4. Id. at 70.  
 5. Id. at 70–77.  
 6. 553 S.W.3d 280, 281 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (per curiam). 
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that her landlord failed to provide her with a habitable living space.7  The ulti-
mate issue assessed by the Missouri Supreme Court involved the propriety of 
allowing Missouri circuit courts to compel tenants to pay withheld rent to the 
courts, in lieu of payment to the landlord, during the course of  litigation.8   
This Note addresses whether the judiciary should have the power to com-
pel tenants to pay their rent to the court (“in custodia legis”) as a prerequisite 
to asserting a breach of the implied warranty of habitability at trial.  Section II 
of this Note will describe the relevant facts and the holding of Kohner.  Section 
III explores the legal background surrounding the implied warranty of habita-
bility and in custodia legis procedures.  Section IV describes the Missouri Su-
preme Court’s holding and rationale.  Finally, the Comment Section of this 
Note argues in favor of the dissenting opinion, that the use of discretionary in 
custodia legis procedures is harmful to the interests of tenants in Missouri. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On October 31, 2014, Latasha Johnson entered into a lease with Kohner 
Properties, Inc. to rent an apartment in St. Ann, Missouri.9  Johnson paid a $200 
security deposit to secure her lease at a rate of $585 per month.10  Upon moving 
into the apartment, Johnson immediately discovered various problems with the 
only bathroom, including missing tiles and cracks on the floor.11  Kohner’s 
property manager informed Johnson that nothing could be done about the bath-
room.12  In November of that year, Johnson noticed a water leak had developed 
in the ceiling of the bathroom above the shower and bathtub.13  Mold began 
growing on the ceiling, and Johnson called Kohner to report the leak and 
mold.14  Over the next few months, Johnson noticed and reported various other 
problems with the bathroom and other rooms in her apartment.15  Other issues 
that Johnson faced involved her kitchen sink, stove, and range.16  She contacted 
the property manager again in February and was told “there was nothing they 
could do.”17 
  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 286.  
 9. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, No. ED 103133, 2016 WL 10998837, at *1 
(Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2016) transferred to Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553 
S.W.3d 280 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. 
2
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Beginning in March of 2015, Johnson withheld her rent because property 
management would not resolve the maintenance requests for the apartment.18  
At 2:00 A.M. on March 17, 2015, the bathroom ceiling in Johnson’s apartment 
collapsed.19  Although Johnson placed an emergency service request to fix the 
ceiling, Kohner’s technician tried to remedy the situation by taping a “black 
plastic bag over the hole in the ceiling.”20  Because water eventually collected 
in the plastic bag, the bag did not fix the leak and Johnson found herself unable 
to get minimal use out of her bathroom.21  Johnson could not safely bathe her 
daughter in the bathtub below the collapsed ceiling and was forced to stay at a 
hotel for a few nights to bathe.22  Johnson withheld her March and April rent, 
and Kohner Properties sued Johnson for the unpaid rent as well as possession 
of the apartment.23 
Before opening statements were given, Kohner moved to bar Johnson 
from asserting either an affirmative defense or a counterclaim based upon 
breach of the implied warranty of habitability.24  Kohner argued that Johnson’s 
failure to pay her rent in custodia legis25 prevented her from asserting any such 
claims.26  This motion was granted, and on May 13, 2015, the Circuit Court for 
St. Louis County entered a judgment against Johnson for the unpaid rent, late 
fees, attorney’s fees, court costs, and possession of the apartment.27  Although 
the circuit court did find as a matter of fact that the hole above Johnson’s bath-
tub had been inadequately repaired, the court found as a matter of law Johnson 
could not assert either an affirmative defense or counterclaim relying on the 
implied warranty of habitability because she had not paid her rent in custodia 
legis.28  Johnson appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern 
District.29 
On appeal, Johnson argued that the trial court erred in barring her from 
asserting the implied warranty of habitability as either an affirmative defense 
or counterclaim and that her failure to pay rent to the court in custodia legis 
  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at *2.  Johnson’s young daughter with cerebral palsy could not make use 
of the bathtub, as the “mold and air conditions in the bathroom aggravated her daugh-
ter’s allergies and irritated her daughter’s eyes to the extent her eyes were beginning to 
droop.” Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
 25. “In custodial legis is defined as ‘[i]n the custody of the law’ and is used in 
reference to property placed in the court’s charge pending litigation over the property.” 
Id. at *2, fn. 3 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)). 
 26. Id. at *2.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
3
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was not “a legal prerequisite to asserting a breach of implied warranty of hab-
itability.”30  Although the Eastern District concluded that it would grant John-
son’s points on appeal and remand her case back to the trial court, the case was 
instead transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court pursuant to Missouri Rule 
of Civil Procedure 83.02.31 
The Missouri Supreme Court, in a three to two per curiam decision, ruled 
in favor of Kohner.32  The Missouri Supreme Court held that circuit courts in 
Missouri have the power to require tenants asserting a breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability to pay their rent to the court during the course of liti-
gation.33 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Society’s evolution from an agricultural-based, agrarian society to a mod-
ern industrial society has prompted concomitant changes in the common law 
principles governing property law.34  This Section tracks changes in the law 
that have precipitated the discussion of in custodia legis procedures as they 
apply to claims for breach of implied warranty of habitability.  First, this Sec-
tion details how the implied warranty of habitability developed and the doc-
trines preceding it, such as caveat emptor, the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and 
constructive eviction.  Second, this Section explains how courts in some juris-
dictions have developed an in custodia legis procedure, along with some of 
their stated policy rationales for doing so. 
A.  The Common Law and the Implied Warranty of Habitability 
At early common law, tenants were subject to the doctrine of caveat emp-
tor – buyer beware.35  Under this doctrine, leases were primarily understood as 
a rental of the land upon which a residence was built, as the land itself was the 
“most important feature of the conveyance.”36  Early common law leases were 
considered a “conveyance of an estate in land and w[ere] equivalent to a sale 
of the premises for the term of the demise.”37  As such, rent was due “without 
  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at *10.  Mo. R. Civ. P. 83.02 (Per this rule, cases resolved by “opinion, 
memorandum decision, written order, or order of dismissal in the court of appeals” may 
be transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court). 
 32. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (per 
curiam). 
 33. Id. at 285.  In making its decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on 
King. Id. at 282 (referencing King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1973)). 
 34. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 68.  
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reference to the condition of the buildings or structures on [the land].”38  Alt-
hough tenants could negotiate with their prospective landlords, such covenants 
were considered “only incidental to the land and independent of the tenant’s 
obligation to pay rent.”39  Caveat emptor imposed a duty on the potential tenant 
to inspect any property before entering into a lease, as there was no warranty 
implied by the landlord.40  At common law, courts traditionally assumed the 
tenant and landlord were of equal bargaining power in the transaction, and ten-
ants wishing to have covenants or warranties in their leases could expressly 
bargain for them.41  However, even if tenants did enter into covenants with their 
landlords for necessary repairs, those covenants were understood as an obliga-
tion by the landlord to the land, and thus “independent of the tenant’s covenant 
to pay rent.”42   
The early common law of real estate leasing carried “harsh results” for 
tenants.43  Because of this, courts started to carve out exceptions to these rules 
by treating the relationship between landlord and tenant “as if governed by 
contract law.”44  One such exception to caveat emptor was the covenant of 
quiet enjoyment, a doctrine under the early common law that suspended the 
tenants’ obligation to tender their rent where the landlord had physically de-
prived them of possession of the land.45  Originally, the implied covenant of 
quiet enjoyment protected only against physical extrusion,46 but the courts soon 
began to consider whether a tenant’s possession could be “molested by some-
thing less.”47 
Thus, the doctrine of quiet enjoyment was expanded with the creation of 
constructive eviction: 
A constructive eviction arises when the lessor, by wrongful conduct or 
by the omission of a duty placed upon him in the lease, substantially 
interferes with the lessee’s beneficial enjoyment of the demised prem-
ises. Under this doctrine the tenant is allowed to abandon the lease and 
excuse himself from the obligations of rent because the landlord’s con-
duct, or omission, not only substantially breaches the implied covenant 
  
 38. Id. at 69 (internal citation omitted).  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at n. 6 (citing O’Neil v. Flanagan, 64 Mo. App. 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1895) 
(“the tenant was not discharged from his obligation to pay rent although the building 
was destroyed by fire”). 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.; see also Dolph v. Barry, 148 S.W. 196, 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912). 
 46. King, 495 S.W.2d at 70. 
 47. Id. 
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of quiet enjoyment but also ‘operates to impair the consideration for the 
lease.’48 
The doctrine of constructive eviction was the first rule created by courts 
that required landlords to ensure habitability and was designed specifically as 
“a substantial breach of a material covenant in a bilateral contract.”49  While 
the covenant of quiet enjoyment protected tenants against intrusions from their 
landlords, the doctrine of constructive eviction evolved to permit tenants to 
abandon their leases upon the mere breach of a duty or substantial interference 
with the land, which is now understood as a breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability.50 
The implied warranty of habitability is a doctrine that has only somewhat 
recently received recognition in Missouri.51  The doctrine provides that the 
landlord-tenant relationship is contractual, and a landlord’s failure to provide a 
habitable living space constitutes a  breach of contract.52  The use of this doc-
trine was thus emblematic of a transition whereupon courts began to recognize 
landlord-tenant relationships as contractual relationships, where the duty to 
maintain the premises was contractually implied for the landlord.53   In effect, 
rent was due to landlords only where the tenant was provided with a habitable 
living space.54    Modern courts justify the doctrine by pointing to the difference 
in bargaining power between landlords and tenants, the regulatory enactment 
of minimum standards of habitability, and tenants’ reasonable expectations of 
habitable dwellings.55   
In 1973, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District, through its 
holding in King v. Moorehead, abandoned caveat emptor and applied the im-
plied warranty of habitability to every residential lease.56  The King court sum-
marized and evaluated the progression of the early common law doctrines of 
landlord-tenant leases and concluded the implied warranty of habitability 
should be read into Missouri real estate leases.57  King involved a suit by a 
landlord against a tenant for possession and unpaid rent of a single-family 
dwelling in Kansas City.58  The tenant in King refused to pay rent until the 
  
 48. Id. (quoting Dolph, 148 S.W. at 198). 
 49. Id. (quoting Dolph, 148 S.W. at 198). 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 75. 
 52. Id. at 75–76. The implied warranty of habitability developed in response to 
societal changes, such as the transition from an agrarian society to an urban society. 
 53. See Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 268–69 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). 
 54. See King, 495 S.W.2d at 75. 
 55. Detling, 671 S.W.3d at 269. 
 56. King, 495 S.W.2d at 75. 
 57. Id. at 69–70, 75. 
 58. Id. at 67.  
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landlord “corrected and abated certain substantial housing code violations.”59  
Finding that the tenant sufficiently pleaded a breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability, the court declared that such pleading was an effective counter-
claim and reversed the trial court’s holding in favor of the landlord.60  King 
held that tenants asserting a breach of the implied warranty of habitability are 
justified in withholding rent until the premises have been restored to a habitable 
degree.61   
The King court reasoned that “modern housing leases are not purely con-
veyances of property interests with independent covenants to perform but are 
also bilateral contracts.”62  To justify their departure from existing case law, 
the court cited policy rationales regarding the ineffectiveness of constructive 
eviction in the face of a prolonged housing shortage.63  Per the King court, the 
implied warranty of habitability developed in response to this housing short-
age, specifically given the shortage’s effects on low income tenants.64  The low 
income tenants that were “most likely to resort to [constructive eviction]” often 
faced a difficult dilemma: “either continue paying rent for an untenable living 
space or abandon the premises.”65  Low income tenants either had to continue 
paying rent for subpar property or “abandon the premises and hope to find an-
other dwelling which, in these times of severe housing shortage [was] likely to 
be as uninhabitable as the last.”66   
The implied warranty of habitability defined in King recognized the duties 
of the landlord and tenant as contractual obligations.67  Specifically, the King 
court declared that a tenant’s obligation to pay rent “is dependent upon the 
landlord’s performance of his obligation to provide a habitable dwelling during 
the tenancy.”68   
The court also outlined factors to consider for the determination of a 
breach of the implied warranty of habitability.69  Whether or not a breach was 
material per the King court depended on factors such as “the nature of the de-
ficiency or defect, its effect on the life, health or safety of the tenant, length of 
  
 59. Id.  The defendant alleged fourteen specific housing code violations such as 
“rodent and vermin infestation, defective and dangerous electrical wiring, leaking roof, 
inoperative toilet stool, [and] unsound and unsafe ceilings.” Id. at 68. 
 60. Id. at 79–80.  
 61. Id. at 77.  
 62. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, No. ED 103133, 2016 WL 10998837, at *3 
(Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2016) (referencing King, 495 S.W.2d at 71). 
 63. King, 495 S.W.2d at 76.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 76–77.  
 67. Id. at 75.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 76.  
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time it has persisted and the age of the structure.”70  The court detailed that 
damages should be “reasonably measured by the difference between the agreed 
rent and the fair rental value of the premises as they were during occupancy by 
the tenant in the unhealthful or unsafe condition.71  Notably, the court in King 
also outlined the procedure for withholding rent by a tenant asserting the 
breach.72  In dicta, the court cited Javins v. First National Realty for the prop-
osition that tenants withholding rent “shall be required to deposit the rent as it 
becomes due, in custodia legis pending the litigation.”73 
Explaining its decision, the court noted that modern landlords are likely 
to have both a stronger interest in, and a better economic position with respect 
to, the property.74  Other policy rationales cited by the King court included 
housing shortages, the disparity in bargaining power between landlords and 
tenants, changing housing codes, which placed responsibilities upon landlords, 
the likelihood that landlords have superior knowledge of the state of the prem-
ises, and the benefit of consumer protection laws to the tenant.75  From this 
reasoning, the court in King abandoned the doctrine of caveat emptor and ap-
plied the implied warranty of habitability to all residential leases in Missouri.76 
In 1984, the Missouri Supreme Court fully incorporated the holding and 
reasoning of King by formally adopting the implied warranty of habitability in 
Detling v. Edelbrock.77  In Detling, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized 
“the evolution of the common law, the modern acceptance of a lease as both a 
conveyance and a contract and the rejection of caveat emptor.”78  The Detling 
court articulated that a breach of the implied warranty of habitability may be 
shown where there is (1) a lease; (2) development of “dangerous or unsanitary 
conditions on the premises materially affecting the life, health and safety of the 
tenant; (3) reasonable notice of the defects to the landlord; and (4) subsequent 
failure to restore the premises to habitability.”79  Citing King, the court stated 
habitability was “measured by community standards, reflected in most cases in 
  
 70. Id.  The court also explained that minor housing violations should be consid-
ered de minimis in regard to the materiality of a breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability. Id.  
 71. Id. (citing Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (N.H. 1971)). 
 72. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). 
 73. Id. (citing Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, n.67 (D.C. Cir. 
1970)). 
 74. Id. at 71.  
 75. Id. at 71–72.  
 76. Id. at 75.  
 77. 671 S.W.2d 265, 269–70 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds 
by Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 78. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, No. ED 103133, 2016 WL 10998837, at *5 
(Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2016) (citing Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 268–69 
(Mo. 1984) (en banc)). 
 79. Detling v. Edelbrock 671 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).  
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local housing and property maintenance codes.”80  The court also noted that 
tenants are required to give notice to the landlord and allow a reasonable time 
for the landlord to correct the situation.81  At the time of Detling, seventeen 
other jurisdictions had also recognized an implied warranty of habitability in 
residential leases.82 
Although Detling marked the formal recognition of the implied warranty 
of habitability by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1984, some questions re-
mained about its proper application.83  In its adoption of the implied warranty 
of habitability, the court in King also echoed support for the in custodia legis 
procedure, which originated with Javins.84  However, the in custodia legis re-
quirement in Javins was not necessary for the resolution of King, and thus the 
procedure was, at the time of Detling, considered dicta.85 
B.  In Custodia Legis Procedure 
The in custodia legis procedure requires tenants-in-possession who seek 
to raise the implied warranty of habitability, as either an affirmative defense or 
counterclaim, to pay their rent during litigation either directly to the trial court 
or to an escrow account.86  Although King described this process, Missouri 
courts dismissed the comment on in custodia legis procedures as dicta because 
it was unnecessary to the resolution of the case.87   
Other state and federal courts across the country have also considered in 
custodia legis as a prerequisite to  assert  the implied warranty of habitability.88  
In a footnote in Javins,89 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit detailed how it believed the in custodia legis requirement 
should function, referring to it as an “excellent protective procedure.”90  The 
Javins court opined, “if the tenant defends against an action for possession on 
  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. (citing King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)). 
 82. Id. at 268–69 n. 4. 
 83. See Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (per 
curiam). 
 84. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (citing Javins v. 
First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 n. 67 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). 
 85. See Kohner Props, Inc., 553 S.W.3d at 283.  
 86. See Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 n. 67 (D.C. Cir. 
1970). 
 87. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, No. ED 103133, 2016 WL 10998837 (Mo. Ct. 
App. Sept. 13, 2016) (citing State ex rel. Baker v. Goodman, 274 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Mo. 
1954) (en banc)). 
 88. See e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d 1071 at 1083 n. 67; Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 
3d 62, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 907 (Pa. 1979); Fritz 
v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Minn. 1973). 
 89. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1083 n. 67.  
 90. Id.  
9
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the basis of breach of the landlord’s warranty of habitability, the trial court may 
require the tenant to make future rent payments into the registry of the court as 
they become due.”91  The Javins court explained the use and function of the 
procedure, one which it noted “would only be appropriate while the tenant re-
mains in possession.”92  The outlined procedure requires the fact finder to make 
a “separate finding as to the condition of the apartment” when a party asks for 
imposition of the procedure.93  
Javins’ recommendation that trial courts be allowed to require an in cus-
todia legis procedure proved influential to courts in other jurisdictions.  For 
example, in Hinson v. Delis,94 the California Court of Appeals relied upon 
Javins in support of the proposition that trial courts have the discretion to en-
force an in custodia legis requirement.95  Hinson described the procedure the 
same way as Javins: a mechanism for trial courts to require that rental payments 
be apportioned among the parties based upon the findings at trial.96   
In Fritz v. Warthen,97 the Supreme Court of Minnesota instructed Minne-
sota trial courts to exercise this power to order tenants to pay their rent to the 
court, after evaluating factors such as “the seriousness and duration of the al-
leged defects, and the likelihood that the tenant will be able to successfully 
demonstrate the breach of warranty.”98  Directing trial courts to follow this 
procedure, the Supreme Court of Minnesota expanded upon Javins’ in custodia 
legis procedure, requiring trial courts to take rent payments from litigants if 
such a procedure would be suitable.99  The Fritz court’s application of the in 
custodia legis procedure was more extreme than its predecessors, instructing 
that trial courts will order the procedure when a question of fact exists regarding 
a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, rather than granting discre-
tionary power.100 
Missouri appellate courts have not often dealt with the issue of the pro-
priety of the in custodia legis procedure.101  In one instance, the Missouri Court 
of Appeals for the Western District cited King in its application of the proce-
dure and found the tenants in question had not paid their rent in custodia 
legis.102  There are no other examples of appellate Missouri case law where a 
  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. 26 Cal.App.3d 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). 
 95. Id. at 70–71.  
 96. Id. at 71.  
 97. 213 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 1973). 
 98. Id. at 343.  
 99. Id. (instructing lower courts that they will take “adequate security therefor if 
such a procedure is more suitable).  
 100. Id.  
 101. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280, 283 n. 2; see also, Tower 
Mgmt., Inc. v. Henry, 687 S.W.2d 564, 565–66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
 102. Tower Mgmt., Inc., 687 S.W.2d at 565–66. 
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tenant remaining in possession was subjected to the in custodia legis proce-
dure.103 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
This Section discusses the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Kohner 
Properties, Inc. v. Johnson.  The court applied relevant precedent to the dispute 
between Latasha Johnson and Kohner Properties and held that circuit courts 
may use discretion to impose an in custodia legis procedure in disputes over 
the implied warranty of habitability.  This Section first examines the majority 
opinion and rationale, then turns to the dissenting opinion, which argued the 
imposition of this procedure was not founded in doctrinal property or contract 
law. 
A.  Majority Opinion 
Authored per curiam, the two-part holding by the majority of the Missouri 
Supreme Court, as a matter of first impression, ruled that “circuit courts may 
exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis to determine whether an in custodia 
legis procedure is appropriate.”104  The court found in favor of the landlord, 
Kohner Properties, and barred the tenant, Johnson, from asserting an affirma-
tive defense or counterclaim of the implied warranty of habitability because 
she failed to pay rent to the circuit court in custodia legis.105  The court affirmed 
the circuit court’s judgment, finding the circuit court’s reliance on King proper, 
even though the relevant language from King was dicta.106   
The court declared that although the in custodia legis requirements as they 
pertained to tenants remaining in possession were dicta, King was the prevail-
ing law in Missouri and had been “dutifully followed by our circuit courts for 
almost five decades.”107  However, until Kohner, the specific issue of whether 
the in custodia legis requirements from King applied to all actions for rent and 
possession when the tenant remained in possession of the property had not been 
examined by the Missouri Supreme Court.108  Reasoning that “the ‘majority of 
the courts which permit rent withholding’ leave the imposition of an in custodia 
legis procedure to the sound discretion of the trial court,”109 the majority found 
  
 103. Kohner, 553 S.W.3d at 283 n. 2.  The Supreme Court of Missouri also noted 
that other circuit courts in Missouri have applied the in custodia legis procedure, how-
ever no examples were provided. Id. 
 104. Id. at 285.  
 105. Id. at 286.  
 106. Id. at 286–87. 
 107. Id. at 283.  
 108. Id. (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.:  LANDLORD & TENANT § 11.3 
(AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
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that the circuit court did not err in barring Johnson from asserting the implied 
warranty of habitability as an affirmative defense or counterclaim.110   
The majority opinion expanded its rationale by providing three policy ar-
guments in support of its decision.111  First, citing the dicta in King, the court 
stated the process assures money is there for the landlord to remedy the unin-
habitable situation.112  The opinion further stated the procedure would effec-
tively minimize the damage to the tenant by encouraging the landlord to make 
necessary repairs as soon as possible.113  Second, the majority opinion argued 
the status quo was preserved through the in custodia legis procedure.114  The 
court described the use of discretionary power as deriving “from a trial court’s 
general equitable powers to protect a landlord from the potential loss of income 
from his property during a prolonged period of litigation.”115  Third, the court 
noted the in custodia legis procedure minimizes the risk to the landlord follow-
ing litigation, should a case arise where a tenant who is found to owe the land-
lord outstanding rent payments is “unwilling or unable” to pay them following 
litigation.116 
B.  Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion, authored by Judge Patricia Breckenridge, focused 
on the lack of “basis in present property law or contract principles” upon which 
the in custodia legis procedure was founded.117  Explaining the evolution of the 
common law from caveat emptor to the implied warranty of habitability, the 
dissenting opinion acknowledged the nature of the bilateral contract, where 
“the tenant’s obligation to pay rent is dependent on the landlord’s performance 
of the obligation to provide a habitable dwelling.”118  The dissent also evalu-
ated the majority’s use of dicta in its holding, pointing out that although the 
majority claimed the dicta had been “dutifully followed by our circuit courts 
for almost five decades,” only one prior case required the in custodia legis pro-
cedure for its resolution.119  
  
 110. Id. at 286–87.  
 111. Id. at 286. 
 112. Id. at 282 (quoting King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1973)). 
 113. Id. (quoting King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)). 
 114. Id. at 285 (quoting MMB Assocs. v. Dayan, 564 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1991)). 
 115. Id. (internal citations omitted).  The majority opinion also noted that a trial 
court is in the best position to assess the merits of the case compared to other courts. 
Id. 
 116. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 117. Id. at 288 (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 287 (citing King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)) 
(Breckenridge, J., dissenting). 
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Judge Breckenridge’s evaluation of the policy implications for allowing 
trial courts to require the payment of rents to the court or an escrow account 
during ongoing litigation responded to the majority’s argument that the proce-
dure effectively preserved the “status quo” of the contractual  relationship be-
tween landlord and tenant during the course of litigation.120  She argued the 
procedure was unnecessary to safeguard the interests of the landlord because 
the landlord was not entitled to the rent at issue until after a “favorable adjudi-
cation.”121  Furthermore, Judge Breckenridge argued such a requirement ulti-
mately placed landlords “in a better position than they would be if tenants did 
not assert an implied warranty of habitability defense.”122  She additionally 
pointed out the inability of the majority to articulate any other types of disputes 
in either contract or property law that require any disputed amount to be paid 
to the court as a requirement for establishing a legal claim.123  As such, the 
dissenting opinion described the procedure as a “financial prerequisite to a ten-
ant’s access to the courts.”124  Lastly, the dissent pointed out a problem inherent 
in the circuit court’s perception that the in custodia legis procedure was man-
datory in the present case.125  Recommending reversal of the circuit court judg-
ment, Judge Breckenridge wrote that Johnson should be afforded an oppor-
tunity “for the circuit court to exercise its discretion in this case,” as it appeared 
to the dissenting opinion that the circuit court applied the law as if the proce-
dure was required, rather than discretionary.126 
V.  COMMENT 
This Section discusses why the per curiam majority of the Missouri Su-
preme Court should have adopted the dissent’s decision and allowed Johnson’s 
affirmative defense of breach of the implied warranty of habitability.  First, by 
allowing courts to discretionarily impose an in custodia legis requirement upon 
tenants, the court overlooked and discounted the negative effects suffered by 
tenants who have asserted their landlords breached the implied warranty of 
habitability, many of whom are low income tenants.  Second, the negative ef-
fects of this doctrine impose a “financial prerequisite” to our judicial system 
and act as a deterrent to claiming a breach of the implied warranty of habita-
bility.  Finally, the doctrine fails to maximize landlord investment in habitable 
properties by minimizing the potential risks of being taken to court. 
  
 120. Id. at 288. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). 
 124. Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). The procedure was mandatory in this case 
as Johnson would not be given an opportunity to argue against the application of the 
procedure in her case.  
 126. Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). 
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In its holding, the majority emphasized the usage of the in custodia legis 
procedure as a means of maintaining the “status quo” between the parties in the 
landlord-tenant relationship.127  Effectively, the status quo is maintained by the 
payment of rent to the court in exchange for the continued tenancy of the prop-
erty in question.128  But as the dissent notes, the imposition of an in custodia 
legis requirement in this circumstance would be unique: the majority could not 
“cite to any other action – based in either property or contract – requiring the 
disputed amount to be paid into the court as a precondition to asserting a de-
fense or raising a claim.”129   
Although this circumstance is unique in the way it relates to a tenant’s use 
of a residence, the law should treat this distinction as a necessary protection for 
low income tenants.  Further, the dissent pointedly stated: “requiring a tenant 
to deposit rent as it becomes due prior to adjudication of a landlord’s claim for 
rent and possession is a financial prerequisite to a tenant’s access to the courts 
to present a claim or defense of a breach of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity.”130  This consequence for tenants involved in housing disputes seems par-
ticularly shocking and problematic.   
A main purpose of implying a warranty of habitability into modern resi-
dential leases is to protect low income tenants who have few options.  Imposing 
even more barriers for low-income tenants to reach the court system to redress 
their grievance shocks the conscience.  While the circumstances at issue here 
are unique, reference to mortgage law principles provides a helpful analogy in 
understanding the disparity between the landlord and tenant in terms of bar-
gaining power.  Courts sometimes place a financial requirement on borrowers 
seeking injunctive relief from their lenders upon a foreclosure of mortgaged 
property.131  While some courts require a full tender of the debt amount on the 
mortgage132 and others require the borrower to tender the amount the borrower 
concedes to be due,133 some “dispense with the tender requirement when the 
plaintiff alleges that defect renders the sale void.”134   
Foreclosed-upon borrowers are likely experiencing serious financial dif-
ficulty.  In the case of a borrower seeking injunctive relief against a foreclosure 
sale, a tender requirement serves as a financial prerequisite that limits the bor-
rower’s equitable relief and is “objectionable when the [borrower] is requesting 
injunctive relief in good faith.”135  While a borrower who has been foreclosed 
  
 127. Id. at 285. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 288. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting).  
 130. Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). 
 131. Grant S. Nelson et. al., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.23 (6th ed. 2014). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
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upon would prefer to simply pay their mortgage and avoid the foreclosure pro-
cess, a tenant living in uninhabitable conditions may likewise prefer to simply 
renovate their living space on their own accord.   
Although the economically disadvantaged party faces a difficult dilemma 
in each scenario, the discrepancy in bargaining power between landlords and 
tenants presents an arguably more unfair dilemma to the disadvantaged tenant, 
who has not promised to repay over time a large sum of money but has merely 
contracted for a tenantable living space.  This analogy is particularly helpful 
because it highlights that foreclosed-upon borrowers are not always required 
to tender outstanding mortgage debt, yet low-income tenants seeking relief 
from the implied warranty of habitability may be compelled by the court to 
escrow their rent akin to a tender requirement. 
One potential reason the procedure may serve as a barrier for low income 
tenants is its effect as a deterrent from bringing a lawsuit for breach of implied 
warranty of habitability in the first place.  Making particular note of the power 
disparity inherent in this type of conflict, Judge Breckenridge stated, “such 
findings ignore the disparity between tenants and landlords that often exists in 
situations in which the implied warranty of habitability is being asserted and 
overlook the likelihood that requiring payment of rent as it becomes due acts 
as a deterrent to tenants wishing to assert the defense.”136  If a low-income 
tenant wishes to assert a breach against their landlord, they could likely make 
significant use of the money instead of paying the rent in custodia legis under 
this holding.  At its conception, the implication of a warranty of habitability 
into modern leases served to minimize the instances of constructive eviction, 
where tenants simply abandoned the property and were forced to seek other 
housing.137  By requiring tenants to make full rent payments to the court in lieu 
of the landlord while they assert their housing is unsatisfactory, the benefits of 
the doctrine are weakened, and constructive eviction becomes more appealing.  
Although the majority argues the procedure preserves the status quo, this hold-
ing may in fact make tenants more likely to find themselves constructively 
evicted – which would be disastrous for the “status quo.”  
The options for tenants living in uninhabitable spaces are limited: tenants 
may either find themselves constructively evicted or choose to withhold rent.138  
If tenants in Missouri may – at the courts’ discretion – be required escrow their 
rent to the court during the pendency of litigation, then they may wish to pursue 
other options, such as using that rent money in an effort to find a new living 
situation.  The in custodia legis doctrine neuters the bargaining power that ten-
ants gain by withholding rent.  By withholding their payments, tenants are able 
to put pressure on their landlords to make their inhabited space livable.  The 
law should allow disadvantaged tenants who are forced to live in squalor to 
pressure landlords by withholding rent.  Granting greater bargaining power to 
  
 136. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280, 288 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) 
(per curiam). 
 137. See generally King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). 
 138. Id.  
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tenants serves the public policy aim of minimizing instances of abusive and 
neglectful landlord practices that lead to such situations in the first place.  In-
stead, by allowing circuit courts to discretionarily rent payments to the court as 
a means of minimizing potential risk to the landlord, the law will be less favor-
able to the neglectful actions that lead to the uninhabitable living situations at 
issue.   
The Kohner opinion does not specify what factors trial courts should use 
to determine whether to exercise discretion in any given case.  While the ma-
jority opinion is correct that trial courts are “in the best position to assess the 
merits of each case,”139 it is unclear what, if any, factors the majority wants 
trial courts to consider when determining whether to require rent be paid to the 
court.  Even though the power to impose these payments may be equitable to 
the competing interests of the parties in some hypothetical instances, the grant-
ing of such a broad and undefined power to the trial courts poses a threat to the 
interests of at-risk and low-income tenants.  Without the provision of clear 
standards for use in determining which tenants must pay their rent in custodia 
legis, Kohner runs the risk of allowing a variety of standards applied in Mis-
souri’s trial courts, which is problematic in its own right.  Given the potential 
impact of an in custodia legis procedure on at-risk or low-income tenants, care-
ful guidelines should be provided for direction to the trial courts.  If courts are 
to implement this procedure, such guidelines could instruct courts to consider 
various relevant factors, such as the tenants rent amount as compared to their 
monthly income. 
The legal system should recognize that landlords and tenants are rarely in 
equal bargaining positions and the risk of nonpayment of rent is one that should 
be borne by the landlord when there is a question of whether tenanted spaces 
meet a modern understanding of habitability.  When courts force tenants to pay 
their rent during litigation, regardless of the habitability of their living space, 
this minimizes the risk to the landlord that the tenant will not have the funds 
available to pay outstanding rent should the landlord win at trial.  Landlords 
who must defend against a breach of the implied warranty of habitability 
should not receive and do not deserve this protection.  As a policy, we should 
encourage landlords to invest in their properties and make them habitable.  
Shifting the risk of litigation to landlords encourages them to properly invest 
in the spaces they offer tenants.  The policy advanced by the holding of the 
Missouri Supreme Court does not maximize landlord investment into habitable 
living spaces and disadvantages low-income tenants. 
In effect, tenants who are already suffering unfavorable living conditions 
bear the risk of litigation because they are deprived of the time value of their 
money when the court holds the money in escrow.  The majority is correct in 
its discussion of this risk allocation – the procedure minimizes the potential 
risk to the landlord.  However, the point of the doctrine is to bring tenants – 
particularly vulnerable and low-income tenants – to parity in the bargaining 
  
 139. Kohner, 553 S.W.3d at 285.   
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process with their landlords by requiring habitable living spaces as a prerequi-
site to “earning” their monthly rent payment.   
The dissenting opinion is stronger in Kohner because it illuminates the 
point that landlords being sued or countersued for a breach has not “earned” 
their rent payment and therefore, has not earned that it be set aside for him in 
the meantime.140  Although the landlord could certainly prevail at trial, forego-
ing an in custodia legis procedure would incentivize landlords to keep their 
living spaces unquestionably habitable.  Having landlords assume the risk of 
nonpayment following litigation could encourage landlords to invest more in 
their properties, especially the properties and living spaces of a lower tier or 
quality, which may be more likely to be found inhabitable.  In short, allocation 
of the risk that the tenant will not have money following litigation would serve 
as a reason for landlords to ensure they are never brought to court by providing 
unquestionably habitable living spaces. 
By placing a “financial prerequisite”141 upon tenants asserting a breach of 
the implied warranty of habitability, we are not preserving the status quo but 
instead granting a windfall to neglectful landlords by minimizing their potential 
risk.  In doing so, we place some of society’s most vulnerable – low income 
tenants – at an increased risk of constructive eviction, effectively negating the 
general benefit of the implied warranty of habitability. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Kohner Properties, Inc. v. Johnson imposes upon the state of Missouri a 
procedure intended to benefit landlords by mitigating their potential risk when 
brought to court on a theory of breach of the implied warranty of habitability.  
Although the intentions of the majority opinion are understandable in seeking 
to preserve the status quo of the relationship between landlord and tenant, the 
status quo should be irrelevant when landlords fail to provide habitable living 
spaces to their tenants.  Landlords are in a superior bargaining position relative 
to tenants, and the law has evolved specifically in response to this imbalance.  
Placing the burden of paying rent during litigation on a tenant when the land-
lord is failing to provide a habitable living environment is harmful to low in-
come tenants who have few options.  Although the in custodia legis procedure 
serves as an effective measure for protecting the interests of the landlord, the 
judiciary should seek to instead protect the more vulnerable party during liti-
gation.  The procedure not only obstructs the tenant by imposing a financial 
prerequisite due to the courts not found in other contract disputes but also real-
locates a financial burden onto a party with less economic bargaining power. 
The change in the law from caveat emptor through constructive eviction 
and the implied warranty of habitability came as a result of our judiciary rec-
ognizing and addressing the reality that a power imbalance is inherent in the 
landlord-tenant relationship.  Rent withholding via the implied warranty of 
  
 140. Id. at 288.   
 141. Id.  
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habitability is a valuable bargaining tactic for the disadvantaged tenant.  By 
giving circuit courts in Missouri the discretionary power to require the payment 
of rent to the court, the bargaining power of modern tenants to stand up for 
themselves against neglectful landlords is minimized. 
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